Why most South African domains fail this
We checked 58,769 South African business domains in 2026. 84% can be spoofed. Not because anyone was careless. Their mail host set up email that way, and nobody has changed it since.
If your IT is outsourced, "security included" usually means antivirus, backups and a spam filter. These records are nobody's job, so nobody does them. Read the full story.
The three records
- SPF lists who may send as you. Only bites with
-alland an enforcing DMARC. - DKIM signs each message with a key in your DNS. Without it, enforcing DMARC junks your own forwarded mail.
- DMARC is the instruction:
p=none,p=quarantineorp=reject, plus where to send reports.
Lookalike domains
SPF, DKIM and DMARC only govern your own domain. They say nothing about yourcompany.com when you own yourcompany.co.za, or about a spelling one letter off. Mail from a domain like that passes every check, because whoever registered it is telling the truth about a domain they really do own.
Run the check above and there is a button underneath the results that generates the usual near-misses of your domain, mistyped letters, swapped pairs, added hyphens, the same name under other TLDs, and asks public DNS which ones are already registered. The ones with a mail server are the ones to worry about.
What this cannot tell you
It reads DNS only: not whether your mail is actually signed, whether anyone reads the reports, or how your inbound filter judges what a genuine message is asking for. The expensive frauds pass all three checks from a real, compromised supplier mailbox. Closing your domain protects your name. Protecting your inbox is a different control.